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 For the community/governor who has a strong preposition to 
casino gaming (e.g., gambler, religious group), his/her 
motivation to participate/accept casino legalization is 
and
 What’s the motivation for the other community/governors who 
are neutral to casino gaming?
 How the casino legalization process evolved and finally reached 
the equilibrium state?
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 Evolutionary game theory (EGT)
 Assumption: people can choose their strategies through a trial-and-
error learning process, which is depended on both their own 
interests and the prevailing preferences
 Replicator dynamic: the success of an organism’s genes is largely 
depended on its fitness to a given environment, which can produce 
more descendents than others
 Economic application: strategic evolution of social mechanisms 
Co-evolutions and interactions of several strategically distinct 
populations with economic relations
1.Introduction
 Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
 ESS refers to an “uninvadable” state when the higher payoff/fitness 
strategies spread over the organism, and hence can not be 
invaded by any small group’s alternative strategy
 Three assumptions must be fulfilled if an ESS can be reached in 
social mechanism
 The time is continuous 
 There is a large enough population that players can not behave 
systematically
 The strategy with higher payoff (i.e., more fitness to the environment) 
will spread over the community
1.Introduction
 The process of casino legalization is an evolutionary game 
as it reveals a strategic interaction between different 
groups’ varied interests
 Casino legalization is influenced by government’s interest on 
economic and political characters, as well as the mass 
community’s preference on social and ethical concerns
 It can be seen as a game of two groups of players with two sets of 
strategies. 
 A finite number of players can choose the strategy to 
advocate/struggle, with reference to their expected payoffs 
Casino legalization will then be achieved as an ESS when it can have 
a higher payoff and can be diffused among the community
1.Introduction
 Consider two groups: governors (G)  and general public (C) 
 For an individual governor, s/he can choose to legalize casino or to 
prohibit it 
 Similarly, an individual from the general public can decide whether 
to advocate casino or to struggle against it
 Public and governor who is “neutral” to casino gaming will 
randomly chosen to express his/her interest
 The related business groups can also roughly grouped as the 
general public
2. The ESS Model 
 The payoffs of the governor
 The payoffs of the general public
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 The relative rewards for the government to legalize casino
 If the rewards increased, more governors would like to legalize 
casino, vice versa 
 The relative rewards for the general public to support 
casino
 If the rewards increased, more public would like to support casino, 
vice versa 
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 The casino legalization may start from either the 
government or the community
 Case I: The government obvious that the casino gaming is 
beneficial to the economy, i.e.,
 Case II: The general public want casino to be operated in 
their jurisdiction, i.e., 
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Case I
 t=0:
 t=1:
The possibility that the governors would like to legalize casino
depends on the perception of the general public
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 Consequently, there are two ESSs when the 
government would like to legalize casino at first place
 If the perception of general public is in general positive
to casino gaming, p=1 and q=1 is the ESS: the casino 
will be legalized with the community’s support
 If the perception of general public is in general negative
to casino gaming, p=0 and q=0 is the ESS: the casino 
will be prohibited with the community’s opposition
2. The ESS Model 
Case II
 t=0:
 t=1:
The possibility that the governors would like to legalize casino
depends on the expected benefit of casino gaming
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 Consequently, there are two ESSs when the general 
public would like to support casino at first place
 If the expected benefit of casino to the economy is 
positive, p=1 and q=1 is the ESS: the casino will be 
legalized with the community’s support
 If the expected benefit of casino to the economy is 
positive negative, p=0 and q=0 is the ESS: the casino 
will be prohibited with the community’s opposition
2. The ESS Model 
 However, if the government has more absolute power on 
the community (or casino is legalized by administrative 
action), it can be legalized as long as the expected benefit 
is significant
 If                     , p=0, q=1 is the ESS
 If                     , p=1, q=1 is the ESS
2. The ESS Model 
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 Consequently, there are three ESSs in the casino 
legalization process  
 If the perception of casino is in general positive, and the expected 
benefit to the economy can be expected, casino will be legalized
with community’s support (case I1 &case II1)
 If the perception of casino is in general negative, and the social 
cost is large, casino will be prohibited (case I2 &case II2)
 If the government has more absolute power on the community, 
casino can be legalized as long as they can be benefited (case III)
2. The ESS Model 
 The government has a privilege in the casino legalization 
process in Asian countries
 In the history, the politics in Asia is a system of unitary government 
with centralized control by a monarch 
 Only Case I & Case III may exist in Asia
 An example of Case II: the case of New Jersey
3. Evidences
 Case I: Singapore 
 The government type of Singapore:  a republic with a 
parliamentary system 
 In 2004, the leadership of Singapore changed, which allowed a 
new orientation that could potentially facilitate the rise of a new 
policy proposal 
 Then in November 2004, PM Lee revealed an Integrated Resort 
proposal on a public debate, which planed to build holiday resorts with 
casinos
3. Evidences
3. Evidences
G: Support
(Cabinet ministers)
 Tourism industry 
 Entrance limitation
 National Council
C: support
(Potential operators & 
investors)                        
 Huge investment
 Employment
G: against
(Cabinet ministers)
 Problem gambling
 Social  impact
C: against 
(Islam and Christian 
communities)
 Social impact
 Ethical concerns
RFC
Parliament
Public debate
 The government paid many efforts to minimize the negative impacts of 
casino gaming (CG↓)
 To restrict the admission of local patrons by issuing an entrance fee to 
Singaporeans 
 To control the problem gambling by setting up a National Council on 
Gambling
 The opponents are minorities in the general public (δ↑): Only around 
15% of Singaporean is Islam; while around 18% is Christian
 Hence Singapore can be legalized casino gaming in 2006
3. Evidences
 Case III: Malaysia
 Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary 
system
 Common Gaming House Act 1957 [Act 289] Section 27A: the 
Finance Minister is allowed to issue a license for the promotion and 
organization of gaming to a company
 After the Genting Highlands became a freehold land from the 
Pahang and Selangor state governments, entrepreneur Lim Goh
Tong applied to establish an integrated resort in Genting Highlands 
in 1969 with casinos
3. Evidences
 The government supported the idea on the grounds that a legal 
casino would curb illegal gaming activities and hasten the 
development of the country's tourism industry (T-CG>0)
 Although the conservative Pan Islamic Party (PAS) was against 
to the opening of casinos for ethical concerns, the government 
has addressed it by specifying clearly that Muslims are not 
allowed to access to the casino (δ↑)
 Then Genting Highlands became the first and only casino 
license holder in 1969
3. Evidences
4. Conclusions: Who will be the next?
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Casino legalization/progression
 Who will be the next?
 China: a cashless “entertainment bar” in Hainan
 Hong Kong: Hong Kong’s Liberal Party had proposed to open 
casinos in 2004
 Thailand: Thai Tourism and Sports Minister had tried to legalize
casino in 2005
 Japan: The Japanese government had drafted a gaming law in 
2010
4. Conclusions: Who will be the next?
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